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Professional self-awareness is widely considered a necessary condition for competent social 
work practice. Alternate prescriptions for self-awareness rely implicitly on varying defini-
tions o f what it means to be a "self" and what it means to be "aware." I will review three ap-
proaches to professional self-awareness conventionally adopted in the literature: (a) simple 
conscious awareness (awareness o f whatever is being exper ienced) , (b) reflective awareness 
(awareness o f a self who is experiencing something) , and (c) reflexive awareness (the self's 
awareness o f how his or her awareness is constituted in direct exper ience) . Strengths and 
limitations o f these three epistemological approaches are discussed. An alternate frame-
work, based on Anthony Giddens's "structuration theory," is developed and advanced as 
a more macro-level and less exclusively psychological understanding o f practitioner self-
awareness. The article concludes with illustrations from practice. 
The notion that social workers should be aware of the "self" in practice 
situations has been advocated as a practice principle for almost as long 
as social work has been a profession.1 Professional self-awareness is widely 
considered a necessary condition for competent social work practice.2 
Definitions of self-awareness rely implicitly on various meanings of the 
term "self." 3 Yet, the question, What does it mean to be a self? is not 
directly addressed in the practice literature. Neither does the literature 
explicitly raise the question, How is it even possible to have a valid aware-
ness of the self when it is the self (itself) who is aware? This central con-
cern is an epistemological one—the relationship of the knower to what 
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is known. Although epistemological issues have been a preoccupation in 
the social work research literature, these issues have received limited at-
tention in the literature on social work practice.4 
In this article, I will review three approaches to professional self-
awareness conventionally adopted in the social work practice literature. 
For present purposes I will define these forms of awareness as (a) sim-
ple conscious awareness (awareness of whatever is being experienced), 
(b) reflective awareness (awareness of a self who is experiencing some-
thing), and (c) reflexive awareness (the self's awareness of how his/her 
awareness is constituted in direct experience). Each of these approaches 
corresponds to an implicit conceptualization of "self." When I use the 
term "self," I am referring to both a "sense of personal identity" as well 
as to assumptions about the sort of person one is.51 will argue that these 
conventional approaches, although valid and useful, offer only a partial 
account of what it means to be a self-aware professional. I will then out-
line an alternative, fourth form of awareness termed "critical reflec-
tivity." The understanding of "critical reflectivity" developed here is de-
rived primarily from critical theory, with special reference to Anthony 
Giddens's "structuration theory."6 As developed in this article, critical 
reflectivity does not displace earlier notions found in the literature but 
rather incorporates them into a more inclusive (and less exclusively psy-
chological) understanding.7 The article will conclude with implications 
for social work practice. 
Conventional Concepts of Practitioner Self-Awareness 
Although the social work profession has been consistent in advocating 
the importance of self-awareness, the literature varies a great deal in the 
way the issue is understood. Each of the three conceptualizations of self-
awareness that I have identified from the literature (simple conscious 
awareness, reflective self-awareness, and reflexive self-awareness) differs 
from the others in its notion of what it means to be a "self" and in its 
assumptions about how one can have self-knowledge. That is to say, each 
relies on distinct philosophies of knowledge and selfhood. 
Simple Conscious Awareness 
At a very basic level, self-awareness is defined in terms of becoming awake 
to present realities, noticing one's surroundings, and being able to name 
one's perceptions, feelings, and nuances of behavior. The self is aware 
of and can recognize what it is experiencing. This self is understood as 
the perceiving subject, the locus for sensations, perceptions, and impres-
sions. Influenced by traditions of gestalt and existential theory, the em-
phasis is on here-and-now contact with the environment. This contact 
experience can be described as unselfconscious in the sense that atten-
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tion and awareness are directed to what is experienced by the self rather 
than to the self who is experiencing.8 
It is what Jean-Paul Sartre refers to as "unreflected consciousness."9 
For this reason, it is more nearly correct to talk about this kind of aware-
ness as pre-self-awareness. However, in the practice literature, alert atten-
tion to details of the here-and-now experience is identified as one form 
of self-awareness—that is, the self being more fully aware.10 Hence, it is 
included in the present discussion. 
I use the term "simple" to describe this way of being aware in order to 
indicate its directness and unselfconscious nature, but there is nothing 
either easy or trivial about its accomplishment.1 1 Simple conscious aware-
ness is what makes both experience and memory possible. Without it, 
the practitioner would not be able to make accurate observations or 
correct assessments. It is a condition sine qua non for articulating one's 
perceptions. Simple conscious awareness is a prerequisite for the other 
forms of self-awareness described in this article. 
How does one go about developing or sustaining simple conscious 
awareness? Gestalt and other existentialist-oriented social workers rec-
ommend activities or "experiments" to focus the individual on "now" 
experiences or to clear away obstacles assumed to disrupt attention to 
the here and now.1 2 In social work, the literature on training for basic 
skills offers suggestions to the student on how to attend to the practice 
situation, with particular emphasis on developing accurate listening and 
observation behaviors. "Listening," suggests one source, "refers to the 
processes of attentively hearing another's words and speech, observing 
her nonverbal gestures and positions . . . and rememberingwhat she com-
municates." 1 3 One frequently prescribed activity is the classical supervi-
sory and training exercise known as the verbatim, process recording. To 
produce a verbatim account of a practice interaction, the student is in-
structed to attend as fully as possible to words, behaviors, affect, and im-
pressions of the client and self during an interview. This full attention to 
the interaction requires that the student engage in what we have termed 
"simple conscious awareness." Later the student is asked to recall and 
reproduce in writing the exact details of the encounter.1 4 Apart from 
basic training guides, however, the practice literature in social work usu-
ally goes no farther than offering simple admonishments that it is nec-
essary for the practitioner to pay attention to the realities of the practice 
situation.15 
Reflective Self-Awareness 
Whereas simple conscious awareness focuses the self on direct experi-
ence, reflective self-awareness turns attention to a self who "has" the 
experience. The self's behaviors, affect, cognitive content, and accom-
plishments become objects of reflection. This seems to be a relatively 
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straightforward formula: the self steps back to observe and consider its 
own performance. However, for certain theorists, this formulation raises 
as many issues as it resolves. The issues can be illustrated through a story 
about a young seeker of wisdom who approached an adept of a particular 
religious tradition asking, "Who am I?" The adept replied simply, "And 
who is asking the question?" Modern philosophers from John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant to Sartre were well aware of the fundamental question 
at the heart of the quest for self-knowledge: "Who is the self who knows 
the self-who-is-known?"16 
Answers to this question have varied within Western philosophical 
traditions. Until the advent of postmodernism, the most common ap-
proaches to the question have included the assumption of some form 
of dichotomy between the knowing self and the self-as-known.17 More-
over, in order to deal with the quandary involved in trying to derive two 
"selves" out of one self, the knowing self is often posited as being created 
specifically in the act of reflecting on itself. Jiirgen Habermas character-
izes this position in the following manner: "The T constitutes itself by 
knowing itself in terms of (bei) an 'other' identified as itself."18 Meta-
phorically speaking, just as the human eye cannot directiy see itself in the 
act of perceiving except when projected in a mirror as image-other, the 
reflecting-self can only know itself as projected or objectified in its con-
scious thoughts, behaviors, social productions, or social consequences. 
Epistemological assumptions: reflective awareness.—There are at least three 
assumptions about the nature of the self that are embedded in this con-
ceptualization of self-knowing. First, self-reflection is thought to be ac-
complished by distinguishing between a subject-self (the reflecting as-
pect of the self) and an object-self (the self as reflected upon). In other 
words, a distinction is made between the self as an " I " and the self as a 
"me." This is similar to George Herbert Mead's classic distinction be-
tween the " I " and the "me . " 1 9 Second, there is an assumption that the 
reflecting self comes into being in the act of reflecting on the experience 
of the object-self.20 This means that the self who is an " I " examines and 
reflects on experience; in doing so, it transcends or stands apart from 
the experience. This subject " I " is not available for empirical investiga-
tion; only the object "me" is.21 To borrow Mead's colloquial explana-
tion, the " I " who knows is not "in the limelight."2 2 Third, it is assumed 
that the greater the separation between subject-self ("I") and object-self 
("me"), the greater the objectivity and therefore the more reliable the 
self-knowledge. One becomes "objective" about the self, much as one 
does about other objects of observation—by distancing the subjective 
element as far as possible.2 3 
The metaphor of distance is often used to describe this objectifying 
process. By standing apart from the self and creating "distance," one can 
look more objectively at oneself.24 At this point in the history of episte-
mological thought, there is no serious debate on the question of whether 
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the quest for objectively valid knowledge about the self is ever fully real-
ized. Most people would agree that our knowledge of ourselves, no 
matter how objective, is always to some extent partial and flawed.25 The 
real debate centers around whether all "objective" knowledge of the 
self should be taken as problematic. Within the postmodern current of 
thought, the idea of a transcendent self capable of "looking down on 
the self" objectively is rejected as a myth. However, others do accept the 
notion that despite our fallibility, human beings have some capacity to 
stand apart from their own characteristics, productions, and behaviors 
in an attempt to objectively examine and evaluate them.2 6 For many of 
the latter thinkers, objectivity is a matter of degree: any way of knowing 
becomes more objective the less it relies on the idiosyncratic perspective 
of a particular knower.27 However imperfect the process and however 
flawed the outcome, proponents argue, this attempt to reflect on a self 
objectified for observation gives human beings enormous cognitive pow-
ers. On the capacity for objective self-reflection rests such crucial, con-
ceptual functions as self-other-object differentiation, inferential learning, 
and causal attribution. It is the ability to objectify the self for considera-
tion that makes personal learning possible. Indeed, the achievements 
of Western science rely on this kind of reflection, understood as the ob-
jectification of experience by distancing the knower from that which is 
known.2 8 
Reflective self-awareness in the practice literature. —This presumption of a 
differentiation between a subject-self who reflects and an object-self who 
is the focus of reflection is the formula for self most often assumed in 
discussions of professional self-awareness in social work practice texts. 
"Practitioner know thyself" is a common injunction, as the social worker 
is urged to make "conscious use of Self."2 9 The practitioner is expected 
to be as objective as possible in reflecting on practice behaviors, atti-
tudes, interactions, and accomplishments. He or she is called upon to 
increase the distance between the reflecting-self and object-self and to 
reduce any negative impact of the subjective self on the practice setting. 
It is within this frame of reference that many introductory textbooks ad-
vise social work students to become aware of their values, needs, and 
biases in order to serve clients more consciously and objectively.30 
Prescriptions for increasing objectivity in self-reflection include scru-
tinizing one's reactions for the presence of biases, using one's colleagues 
to provide objectivity, eliciting feedback from clients, using reflective 
tools such as audio and video tapes, engaging in good supervision, ex-
amining cognitive products of the self such as reasoning and judgment, 
and attending to the practice knowledge assumed to be implicit in the 
daily activities of practice.31 The attempt to introduce evaluation of out-
comes as a routine element of professional practice may also be seen as 
a way of creating an objectifying distance between the professional and 
his or her practice behaviors and achievements. The impact of profes-
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sionally guided behaviors in the direct-practice setting is objectified for 
routine examination, in part so that the practitioner may become aware 
of what behaviors and assumptions he or she may need to modify in or-
der to make practice more effective.32 In all of these prescriptions, the 
practitioner as knowing-self is asked to reflect on the performing-self by 
positing his or her thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and accomplishments 
as other. 
Reflexive Self-Awareness 
Philosopher Thomas Nagel suggests that some of the most crucial prob-
lems in human knowledge revolve around the following question: "How 
to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with 
an objective view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint in-
cluded." 3 3 With a minimum of polemic, Nagel's comment summarizes 
one of the central problems in postmodern discourse. Contemporary 
postmodernism challenges the notion of a self-contained and transcen-
dent self able to stand apart from experience and observe the "world" 
from some privileged and "uncontaminated" viewpoint.34 Any knowl-
edge we have of our world, most postmodernists maintain, is "insider 
knowledge." When self-knowledge is the issue, the problem is com-
pounded. We are ineluctably insiders in developing self-awareness. 
Those who support this view argue that the goal of stepping away from 
the self to find a perspective that transcends the self is essentially unat-
tainable. We cannot observe and make judgments about the self the way 
we can about another. This is because our knowledge of the self is in-
herently reflexive—that is, self-referential.35 Any judgment or critique of 
the self based on self-awareness is made by the same self being judged 
or critiqued. This implies that statements made on the basis of self-
awareness are not simply descriptive statements about an objective self 
but expressions of that self. Consider Ludwig Wittgenstein's well-known 
example concerning differences between the two assertions "she is in 
pain" and "I am in pain." 3 6 The first is a statement one makes about the 
other, a statement that can be substantiated with empirical data. The 
second statement, however, is not an empirical description. This is be-
cause the statement is not simply describing the pain; it is itself an articu-
lation of the pain.37 
If this much of the argument is allowed, then how is it possible to even 
conceive of a valid awareness of the self? The answer to this question re-
quires that we decathect the notion of validity from the concept "objec-
tivity" and allow that there may be valid forms of subjective knowledge.38 
In knowing the self, suggests philosopher Paul Ricoeur, the relationship 
between self and other is one of identity or "mutual belonging." 3 9 Valid 
knowledge of the self becomes possible not by creating distance and oth-
erness but by reducing the "distance" and relying on sameness between 
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knower and known. The answer to the question of how I can know the 
self is not "because I am able to step back and look at myself objectively" 
but rather "because I am on more or less familiar terms with the self; I 
am not a stranger to myself."40 
Epistemological assumptions: reflexive awareness. —There are a number of 
assumptions about the self that are central to this conceptualization of 
self-awareness. First, whereas the reflective formulation described above 
emphasizes differentness and distance between an " I " and a "me" in the 
quest for valid self-knowledge, the reflexive version of self-awareness em-
phasizes that distinctions between an " I " and "me" are ontologically 
meaningless. The observing 'T" and the observed "me" occupy the same 
"space," experience the same biography, have the same heredity, and 
belong to the same socializing communities. Any self-observation or self-
critique is shaped by the identical social conditions that influence all 
learned characteristics of the self, including the very behaviors being ob-
served. Second, the notion of a transcendent self that is able to stand 
apart to view the self from some privileged vantage point is rejected as 
being epistemologically impossible. As Nagel suggests, there is no "view 
from nowhere." 4 1 It would not be possible to conceive of a valid aware-
ness of the self without simultaneously monitoring and critiquing how 
the " I " (the knowing subject) constructs that awareness. Metaphorically 
speaking, advocates of a reflexive approach would say, "Yes, view yourself 
and your behavior in a mirror, but as you look in the mirror, also con-
sider ways in which the shape/substance of the mirror itself, the light-
ing, the eye or eyesight of the viewer, and the viewer's particular angle 
of observation contribute to the construction of the image." Third, al-
lowance is made for the possibility of a valid subjective knowledge of the 
self, including self-understanding, personal insight, and intuition. By the 
term "subjective knowledge," I mean knowledge derived largely from 
the unique perspective of the knowing-I, not the term "subjective" in its 
more pejorative meaning of "contaminated" or "biased." Subjectivity is 
treated here not as a source of error to be contained but rather as a way 
of knowing in its own right. As Nagel maintains: "Sometimes... the truth 
is not to be found by traveling as far away from one's personal perspective 
as possible" (emphasis added). 4 2 
Those who object to the reflexive formulation argue that without an-
choring our knowledge of self more rigorously in "objective" reality, the 
possibilities for self-misrepresentation are enormous. We ourselves be-
come the major barrier to a valid, subjective or objective knowledge of 
the self.43 In response to such critics, proponents of a reflexive approach 
to self-awareness are quick to point out that it is not their claim that all 
such knowledge is necessarily accurate or true.4 4 They argue that they 
make the same limited knowledge claim that can be made for more 
objectivist approaches to self-awareness—that is, the claim that self-
knowledge, while possible, is always approximate and imperfect and that 
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we are often opaque to ourselves. Finally, they suggest that whatever its 
limitations, reflexive self-awareness does form the basis for such crucial 
conceptual functions as personal meaning, interpersonal and interpre-
tive understanding, and accurate empathy as a way of knowing self and 
other. Indeed, it can be said that reflexive self-awareness is sine qua non 
for interpersonal communication to occur since such communication 
rests, in part, on one's ability to use intuitive familiarity with his or her 
own experience (derived from one's socializing communities) as a way 
of understanding others.45 
Reflexive self-awareness in the practice literature. —Both the early and the 
more contemporary clinical practice literatures contain examples of 
prescriptions for reflexive self-awareness in practice. Long before social-
science research took its so-called reflexive turn in the 1970s, many social 
work practitioners and academics, particularly those interested in clini-
cal practice, underscored the need for reflexive awareness of the self as 
integral to competent work with clients. Of course, this early clinical dis-
course was more post-Freudian and analytic than postmodern and con-
structivist, and the terminology was more likely to include concepts like 
"transference," "countertransference," and "defense mechanisms" in-
stead of more contemporary terms like "narrative," "deconstruction," 
and "text." 4 6 Still, a kind of reflexivity was implied when the clinical prac-
titioner was urged to consider how the self of the clinician, formed 
through early life experiences, contributed to clinical perception and 
judgments as well as, in part, to the behaviors and reactions of the other 
person. In this traditional approach to practice, clinical responses to the 
other were understood to be reactions to aspects of the self—if not en-
tirely, then at least in part. For instance, a social worker might discover 
that his or her angry response to a client's behavior had as much, or 
more, to do with issues in the practitioner's own life experience as with 
the client's situation.47 Practitioners were advised to use therapy and pro-
fessional supervision to become increasingly aware of the ways in which 
the here-and-now practice situation was filtered through lenses shaped 
by their own early life experiences, particularly experiences with their 
family of origin. This kind of reflexive self-awareness was thought to re-
duce errors in the attribution of causality, intentionality, and affect as 
well as to increase the relevance of clinical insight and understanding. 
Within the past 8 to 10 years, journals and texts in clinical social work 
have begun to pay increasing attention to the implications of a con-
structivist perspective for practice and teaching.48 Introduced into the 
social work literature largely through the family therapy, feminist, and 
qualitative-research literatures, constructivism forms the basis for newer 
approaches to clinical practice with families and individuals, including 
"solution-oriented treatment," "narrative therapy," and "dialogic ther-
apy." 4 9 Those who adopt this perspective emphasize that whatever is 
defined as reality in a person's experience is not simply an objective 
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given.5 0 Rather, a person's reality is seen as co-constructed by individual 
consciousness in interaction with the social and physical environment 
and mediated through language and culture.51 Within the social-
constructivist framework, even the notion of an individual and separate 
self, a center of perception and action who is solely responsible for defin-
ing his or her own existence, is called into question. Instead, the self is 
viewed as a process, an ongoing, fluid construction whose identity is in-
extricably linked to social context and interpersonal interactions.52 The 
self construct is defined, at least in part, in dialogue with other people's 
understandings of who the self is. 5 3 
In the practice setting, it is understood that the self-narratives of both 
client and worker together create the context in which the therapeutic 
work occurs. Clinical practice, therefore, is necessarily reflexive; there is 
nothing that goes on in the clinical interaction that does not contain 
some aspect of the clinician's self.54 Although the term "self-awareness" 
is not generally used by proponents of these newer approaches (since 
it is generally assumed that there is no concrete "self" of which to be 
aware), practitioners are encouraged to consider reflexively their own 
current narratives, the stories they are telling themselves about them-
selves, within the immediate clinical situation.55 In addition to the clini-
cal merit attributed to reflexive techniques, greater practice accounta-
bility is said to be achieved when the clinical practitioner makes his or 
her narratives (or metaphors or stories) explicit and more available for 
self and other. 5 6 Through this process, the practitioner comes closer to 
understanding how his or her experience of self is constituted in inter-
action with others and how together with the client, worlds of meaning 
are created anew in each clinical instance. 
A Synthesizing Perspective: Critical Reflectivity 
In the frameworks described above, to be self-aware means (1) to expe-
rience "contents" of awareness (simple conscious awareness), (2) to 
stand back in order to observe and critique those contents (reflective 
awareness), (3) to understand how the history and person of the clini-
cian impacts clinical performance (the Freudian and ego psychology ver-
sion of reflexive awareness), or (4) to become aware of those processes 
by which the self interacts with others to create meaning and identities 
(the social constructivist version of reflexive awareness). In the first con-
ceptualization, the self is understood as the simple perceiving subject, 
the unreflective locus for sensations, perceptions, cognition, and impres-
sions. In the second, the self is seen as both transcendent " I " and as 
objectified "me"—with the " I " capable of standing apart and evaluating 
beliefs, behaviors, and accomplishments of the "me." In the third and 
(especially) fourth versions of practitioner self-awareness, the self is a 
construct that is continuously emerging within specific social contexts— 
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that is, the self as co-constructor of his or her immediate worlds of mean-
ing. The self in each of these traditions is the self of individual or inter-
personal psychology—the location for thoughts, feelings, perceptions, 
sensations, meanings, intentions, experiences, behaviors, biases, and so 
forth. 5 7 
Each of these notions about practitioner self-awareness has an impor-
tant role in assisting the social worker to learn about aspects of his or her 
performance in immediate practice settings, and it is not my intention 
to suggest their displacement. However, there are limitations inherent 
in definitions of self-awareness that focus exclusively on the individual 
psychology of the practitioner or, at most, on his or her micro-
transactions. Remaining persistently psychological or sociopsychologi-
cal, these conventional understandings of practitioner self-awareness 
have given little attention to human consciousness and awareness (in-
cluding self-awareness) as a larger epistemological and sociological prob-
lem. "The identity of self," suggests critical theorist Brian Fay, "is so tied 
up with the nature of the society in which it resides that the former is 
unthinkable without the latter."58 In this section, I first outiine a macro-
conceptualization of the self derived from critical theory—in particular, 
Giddens's "structuration theory"—and then discuss implications for 
practice and for the principle of "professional self-awareness." 
Giddens's Structuration Theory 
When seventeenth-century mathematician Blaise Pascal made his fa-
mous political/religious observation that "what is truth on one side of 
the Pyrenees is error on the other," he was one of the first thinkers 
to suggest a relationship between social systems and personal awareness 
and thought.59 Over the course of the past 2 centuries, a good deal 
of sociological thinking has considered the relationship between social 
structure and individual consciousness.60 Attempts to link the two social 
phenomena in some systematic way have been a preoccupation in the 
philosophy and sociology of knowledge. Two of the most persistent ques-
tions in this literature have been (a) "How is social structure related to 
human consciousness and awareness?" and (b) "What is the role of hu-
man agency (action) in this relationship?" 
Those theorists concerned with the impact of social structure on hu-
man consciousness have tended to concentrate on larger macro-theory 
issues and to adopt a perspective on the function of social science consis-
tent with the one advanced by Emile Durkheim.61 According to Durk-
heim, the proper objects of social science are social facts. Social facts 
are constituted by social regularities, patterns, and structures external to 
(and separate from) individual understandings and meanings and not 
reducible to those meanings.62 Those who adopt this perspective as well 
as others who approach sociological phenomena with a macro-lens tend 
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to make human consciousness and thought a by-product of social sys-
tems and institutions external to human consciousness.63 Thus, human 
agency is limited to either response or resistance to received structural 
arrangements. By contrast, theorists concerned with issues surrounding 
the role of human agency have tended to focus on micro-sociological 
issues and to adopt a perspective on social science that is more conso-
nant with the one advocated by sociologist Max Weber. Weber defined 
sociology as "a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of 
social action. . . . In 'action' is included all human behavior when and 
in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to i t . " 6 4 
Though Weber himself explored large, macro-issues, many theorists who 
subsequently adopted his perspective on the sociological task have placed 
emphasis on the formation of "meaningful realities" in the more inti-
mate arena of everyday human encounters.65 When these theorists take 
note at all of larger systemic phenomena, it is generally to observe that 
social structures and institutions give context to and set limits on the 
meaning actors can create in a given interaction.66 
Thus, macro-theorists have emphasized the inevitability of received so-
cietal structures and their determinative impact on human social life and 
awareness. In contrast, micro-theorists have tended to emphasize the fra-
gility of the more immediate "worlds" of meaning that human agents co-
construct in interaction with others. The former group of thinkers give 
a poor account of human agency and the latter, a poor account of the 
development and persistence of human structural arrangements.67 
Giddens suggests that because the problem of social structure and the 
problem of human action have appeared in the literature as divergent 
issues, a consistent theory of how human agency is involved in the de-
velopment, persistence, and transformation of human institutions and 
structures has not been well developed. Giddens's structuration theory is 
an effort to address this issue.68 According to his theory, there is a recur-
sive quality to the relation between human beings and their social struc-
tures and institutions. That is to say, society and its structures are both 
condition and outcome of the actions of human beings in time. It is just 
as true to assert that persons, as selves and as identities, are shaped, sus-
tained, and modified by the structures and practices of their socializ-
ing communities/societies as it is to say that "institutions, or large scale 
societies, have structural properties in virtue of the continuity of the ac-
tions of their component members." 6 9 
Giddens's theory of the duality of social structure raises two immediate 
epistemological questions: (a) "Just how aware is the lay person of the 
manner in which societal structures and arrangements condition his or 
her awareness and action?" and (b) "How aware is the lay person of the 
manner in which his or her day-to-day activity over time constitutes and 
reconstitutes society?" In answer to these questions, Giddens posits three 
pivotal ways of knowing. The first he terms "mutual knowledge." By 
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"mutual knowledge" Giddens means the "knowledge of convention that 
actors must possess in common in order to make sense of what both they 
and other actors do in the course of their day-to-day social lives." Society 
and social structures, Giddens maintains, are maintained by the pat-
terned application in practice of "what everyone knows." 7 0 In addition 
to mutual knowledge as a precondition for human social interaction, 
Giddens posits two subsidiary forms of knowledge: "discursive knowl-
edge" and "practical knowledge." "Discursive knowledge" is knowl-
edge to which people can give expression—knowledge available for dis-
course. Colloquially speaking, it is what we know and know we know. By 
contrast "practical knowledge" is knowledge embedded in social prac-
tices; it is articulated in acts rather than discourse. Giddens's "practical 
knowledge" is similar to Michael Polyani's "tacit knowledge"—knowl-
edge implicit in the act of performing a skill or engaging in routine prac-
tices and judgments.71 Fay calls this "embodied" knowledge—that is to 
say, precognitive or extracognitive knowledge.72 For example, cultural 
rules that govern how men and women interact are revealed in the inter-
actions themselves. If a cultural outsider should ask about such rules, an 
insider may have difficulty answering the question because such behav-
iors are simply accepted as something natural and given. Practical knowl-
edge is primarily about the internalized rules and beliefs that guide so-
cial interactions without conscious attention to those rules and beliefs. 
For Giddens, practical knowledge is essential to the reflexive monitoring 
of our day-to-day activity as competent social actors. It is the way we im-
plicitly "know" about the social conditions that inform our behavior and 
thought. It is the way we know what to do and what we can expect others 
to do without having to think about what we know.73 
Of course, "what everyone knows" depends a great deal on the loca-
tion of the knower within a given social structure. Actors may be situated 
in varying places relative to power, access, opportunity, and ideology, and 
all of these factors enter into the calculus of what one knows. For in-
stance, what a member of a marginalized, ethnic minority knows about 
racism will be different than what a member of the majority group might 
know. What a Wall Street broker knows about how the class structure 
of society is preserved on a day-to-day basis will be different from what 
a member of the working class knows about the matter. Indeed, even 
though actors contribute to society's constitution and production, they 
do so "under conditions that are [not] wholly intended . . . by them." 7 4 
Nevertheless, the critical issue here for Giddens is the contention that 
actors do know much more about what they are doing in the course of 
their daily activities than they can generally articulate. "Every social actor 
knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society 
of which he or she is a member" because social actors reproduce that 
society in their everyday activities.75 That is to say, the domain of practical 
knowledge is larger than that of discursive knowledge. 
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To illustrate, Giddens uses the example of the reproduction of the 
structure of a given language. It is clear that when a native speaker uses 
a language, he or she is not consciously (discursively) aware of reproduc-
ing and perpetuating the grammar and syntax of the language. If asked 
to describe the activity, the speaker would no doubt say that he or she is 
merely trying to express an idea or feeling in a manner that will be un-
derstood by the other party. Nevertheless, in point of fact, those who 
speak, use, or write a language do contribute to the reproduction of a 
language, doing so in the very act of communicating through use of that 
language.76 Now suppose one were to ask the speaker, "How is it that 
English or French or Urdu survives as a language, more or less intact, 
from generation to generation?" When asked to reflect on this larger 
structural question, the thoughtful actor might have some sense of this 
larger picture. For example, he or she might say, "Because it is a living 
language," or, to be more pragmatic, "Because I and others use it ev-
ery day." 7 7 
Giddens's language example is an uncomplicated case. Consider a 
more complex issue—for example, the class structure of a society. Criti-
cal theorists might ask the following questions: 
What do people socialized into the middle and upper classes of a society need 
to know (in the sense of Giddens's "practical knowledge") about how to act in 
relation to another member of that same class in order to be accepted as be-
longing? 
What do they need to know about how to act in relation to someone from a 
lower class in order to maintain their own class position? 
What do people in lower class strata need to know about how to act to be ac-
cepted by someone from the same class? 
What have they learned about how to behave, what to believe, and how to think 
in relation to someone from the middle or upper classes? 
More important, what do actors know about how the class structure of society 
is maintained or modified in their everyday interactions? 
If asked to reflect on intentions, actors may be aware of acting or wanting 
to act in such a way that they find acceptance among others perceived to 
be most like them. Or they may say that it is easier to relate to particular 
categories of people or to those who live or work in close proximity. It is 
probably not their conscious intention to reproduce the class strata of 
their society with each of these interactions (according to Giddens, "in-
tention" or "motivation" are not the same as practical knowledge; we 
may behave in ways that are not entirely consistent with our intentions 
or overt purposes). Can actors come to identify (at least) some of the 
extended social and structural consequences of their individually in-
tended actions? Yes, according to Giddens. If encouraged to reflect on 
their own behavior and assumptions in light of the larger structural ques-
tion, then individuals could conceivably arrive at an awareness that when 
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they and others in society act and interact in specific, class-determined 
ways (doing so consistendy over time), a society's class structure is pre-
served and reproduced. Of course, it is true that some actors—those 
with more power and influence—may have a disproportionate effect in 
reinforcing the structures and practices that in turn enhance their power 
and influence. And it is true that some actors will not be able to recog-
nize very much of the larger picture for a variety of reasons (e.g., ide-
ology, socialization, or marginalization) or may not even wish to see it 
(the "not seeing it" perhaps being part of what permits the activity to 
continue).7 8 But this only serves to support Giddens's contention that 
members of a society, each from his or her own position and set of inter-
ests, act in such a way that the structure of society is reproduced. 
Reconceptualizing Practitioner Self-Awareness 
In developing his theory of society that links a macro-conceptualization 
of structure with micro-considerations of human agency, Giddens articu-
lates the concept of a self who is consummately a social actor.7 9 To sup-
port his major themes, Giddens also sketches a theory of human con-
sciousness.80 In this section, I extend Giddens's concepts of self and 
consciousness to an understanding of self-awareness based on his no-
tions. It is my major thesis that if the self is conceptualized as inextricably 
emersed in society's structures both as agent and as product, any exclu-
sively psychological account of self-awareness will be incomplete. 
There are several crucial assumptions about the nature of the self 
and consciousness that can be extracted from Giddens's perspective in 
order to develop a more macro-concept of self-awareness. First, "under-
standings which selves, as social actors, have of themselves and their so-
ciety" are constitutive elements of social structure just as those very self-
understandings are artifacts of the social world.81 The self is ineluctably 
insider not only to his or her own immediate "worlds of meaning" but 
also to the larger social world accomplished together with others. This 
means that knowledge about self-in-society is always, to some extent, sub-
jective and reflexive. Second, this self who is co-constructor of a social 
reality nevertheless comes into being in the context of social structures 
that exist prior to the self. Indeed, the structural achievements of society 
necessarily exceed the meanings and activities of any constituent self. 
Thus, there is an externality to the institutions and structures we co-
constitute and cosustain as a society.82 To the extent that this is true, the 
self and its social context are available to systematic and objective forms 
of reflection.83 Third, the self, as conceptualized here, lives simultane-
ously in "the world" (externalized structures cocreated and covalidated 
with others) and in "my world" (the self and social world as internalized 
and given meaning by the self). These worlds interpenetrate with various 
degrees of correspondence or distortion. As Peter L. Berger and Thomas 
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Luckmann suggest: "Others have a perspective on this common world 
that is not identical with mine. My 'here' is their 'there.' My 'now' does 
not fully overlap theirs. All the same, I know that I live with them in a 
common world. . . . [and] that we share a common sense about its re-
ality." 8 4 Finally, the self that emerges in this framework is a self who can-
not escape his or her day-to-day involvement in the ongoing construc-
tion, maintenance, or renewal of the structures of society. This is an 
activist conception of self—a self whose actions have importance not 
only for his or her immediate relationships but for the maintenance 
and alteration of society itself. In one manner of speaking, then, self-
reflection is always a reflection on society and vice versa.85 
What are the implications of this way of understanding the self for the 
concept of practitioner self-awareness? More pragmatically speaking, on 
what "content" does the self reflect, and what questions does one pose? 
In a general sense, there are three types of questions posed in critical 
reflectivity: (a) questions about "the world," (b) about "my world," and 
(c) about correspondences and contradictions between those worlds. 
Questions having to do with the category "the world," for example, 
might include any of the following: 
What are the structures of my society, in particular, those structures related to 
power, inequality, and marginalization? 
On what basis are these structures rationalized by members of society? 
What social behaviors, values, or assumptions hold such structures in place? 
What is my location in relation to each of these structures? What do I know 
(Giddens's practical and discursive knowledge) about how people in my location 
are supposed to act with regard to others in the same location (location in rela-
tion to the social categories class, race, power, gender or other) or toward those 
in other social groups? 
Who benefits from such structural arrangements and who loses? How do I 
benefit or lose? 
In what ways do my assumptions and activities contribute to the maintenance 
or transformation of such social structures? 
What have I discovered (what can I discover) about the extended structural 
consequences of my social actions and that of others? 
These and similar questions can be approached empirically and with 
some measure of objectivity, particularly when inquiry is conducted in 
concert with others whose perspectives may reflect different locations 
within the social structure. 
About "my world," questions might include the following: 
What do I believe about myself, my place in the world, and about the place of 
people like or different from me? 
What assumptions do I make and what values do I hold about my social world 
and its structures, including structures of systematic domination and inequality? 
What is my understanding about how to act in relation to someone who be-
longs to a different class, race, status, and so forth? And from what sources have I 
learned these social lessons? 
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Which of these structural arrangements have I internalized? How do I ratio-
nalize them? How do my actions reflect or repudiate these beliefs and values? 
These and similar questions require a familiarity with the self and with 
the meanings and understandings the self has constructed. These ques-
tions do not yield to objective forms of inquiry. "My subjectivity,,, suggest 
Berger and Luckmann, "is accessible to me in a way. . . [the other's] can 
never be . " 8 6 
Finally, there is a set of questions that relate to similarities and differ-
ences between what the self understands about society and self ("my 
world"), on the one hand, and the lived, objective conditions of social 
life ("the world"), on the other. For instance, I might ask any of the 
following: 
In what ways are my values, beliefs, attitudes, assumptions, and self-understand-
ings reflections of economic, social, educational, or other systems?87 
To what extent do I accept (or accept uncritically) the values, beliefs, assump-
tions, and prescriptions I have received as a result of my socialization into particu-
lar communities? 
To what extent do I accept the structures of my society as unproblematic, es-
pecially structures related to power and privilege? To what extent am I able or 
willing to raise questions about them? 
Are there inconsistencies or distortions between my received beliefs/assump-
tions and the concrete conditions of individual and group life? How do I account 
for these contradictions? 
In what ways are my perspectives, beliefs, values, and assumptions related to 
my self-interest and perceived needs? 
Are there contradictions between my avowed intentions or values and the 
structural outcomes of my activities? 
These kinds of questions require critical, reflective consideration by so-
cial actors of their subjective understandings of society and self in light 
of the objective structures that form and inform human consciousness 
and thought. It also requires a consideration of social structural arrange-
ments in light of human consciousness and behavior, which constitute 
and perpetuate society on an ongoing basis. As critical theorists often 
maintain, "neither social conditions nor intersubjective meanings alone 
constitute the whole of reality."88 
Engaging in Critical Reflectivity: A Case Example 
An illustration may help us to better understand how critical reflectiv-
ity differs from the other approaches to self-awareness. Consider racism 
as one structural feature of society in the United States. Most general-
practice textbooks urge students and professionals to become aware of 
their biases and prejudices, specifically with regard to racial and cul-
tural minority groups. As oudined above, the conventional approaches 
to self-awareness in practice include the more objective-oriented reflec-
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tive practice and the more subjective-based reflexive awareness. Those 
who advocate reflective practice would counsel the student or practi-
tioner to take time to think objectively about patterns of behavior, affect, 
perception, and behavior, identifying any such patterns that may reflect 
bias or discrimination. Social workers are also encouraged to examine 
systematically practice behaviors with respect to racial and ethnic popu-
lations. The goal of this sort of reflection would be for each worker to 
identify and correct negative feelings, attitudes, or perceptions related 
to people who belong to particular social categories (e.g., race). This 
issue becomes an important topic in supervision as the supervisor assists 
the social worker in examining his or her behavior and affect carefully.89 
By contrast, those who adopt a reflexive approach to self-awareness 
would encourage the social worker to examine how his or her conscious-
ness enters into and shapes awareness and experience in each encoun-
ter. They would invite practitioners to tell their own narratives about who 
they are and how their own unique stories predispose them to particular 
ways of perceiving and knowing. The goal is for social work practitioners 
to understand how the selves they are and the background they bring to 
each encounter intersects with the stories of other social actors to pro-
duce particular meanings, understandings, or distortions.90 The larger 
question would be how racism is woven into their self-narrative. 
Utilizing either of these more conventional strategies for self-aware-
ness, some practitioners may come to recognize personal characteristics 
or experiences that are related or contribute to racism. This, of course, 
is the overarching objective of such self-examination. However, other so-
cial workers may conclude that they are relatively free of racist thoughts 
or attitudes. Although these workers may be deeply troubled that there 
are people who are known to harbor biased attitudes and intentions to-
ward one or another racial minority group, they feel confident that they 
themselves are peripheral to the problem. And they may be correct as 
far as such reflection takes them. As Giddens explains: "Agents can 
sometimes express their reasons for what they do in verbal or discursive 
form. Individuals can in some degree . . . give accounts of the circum-
stances of their actions. But this by no means exhausts what they know 
about why they act as they do. Many most subtle and dazzlingly intricate 
forms of knowledge are embedded in, and constitutive of, the actions 
we carry out." 9 1 When reflective questions about bias and intolerance 
are confined to micro-examinations of personal understandings, affects, 
and motivations, these "more intricate forms of knowledge" remain un-
tapped. Having identified no personal racist feelings or intentions, some 
individuals even find it possible to distance themselves from the problem 
of racism: "Society may be racist or other people maybe racist, but there 
is little I can do about that." 
How would proponents of critical reflectivity approach this issue? Con-
tinuing with the example of racism in social work practice, let us assume 
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the context of a social work case manager in an urban community mental 
health center. Let us further assume that this case manager is a Cauca-
sian female.92 She is consciously committed to reflective practice in the 
traditional meaning of the term; for example, she routinely uses super-
vision to identify and correct any biases that may be reflected in her 
behavior, assumptions, or intentions. So she is surprised and dismayed 
when her supervisor notes that, based on aggregate data for the prior 
2 years, African-American clients for whom this social worker has as-
sumed case-management duties have fared less well on certain outcome 
variables related to successful community tenure. For example, African-
American clients on her case load are disproportionately hospitalized. 
Further, they are more likely to be admitted involuntarily and with the 
involvement of the legal system.93 If this social worker were to rely solely 
on conventional prescriptions for reflective practice, she may conclude 
that she had worked hard to eliminate biases in her personal and profes-
sional life. She may also come to the conclusion, perhaps with some jus-
tification, that in her practice she consciously seeks to provide the very 
best service for all her clients regardless of social categories. If she were 
limited to this sort of reflection, the social worker could only assume that 
if client outcomes for community tenure seem to be structured along 
racial lines, the problem must be related to factors outside of her con-
trol, perhaps to something about the client group itself.94 
However, this social worker's reflectiveness does not stop at this point. 
She understands that racism is much more than a matter of personal 
attitudes, affect, and intentions that devalue members of specific groups. 
Those who advocate critical reflectivity as an approach to self-awareness 
would start with the assumption that no one and no institution escapes 
complicity in society and its structures. This would suggest that many of 
the social activities of the self have structural implications with regard to 
racism even when one's conscious attitudes and intentions may not sup-
port racism. In critical reflectivity, questions would center on the rela-
tionship between seemingly unproblematic, everyday behavior and ra-
cially structured outcomes. The social worker in this case might reflect 
on some of the following questions: 
What do I (we) do in the agency on a day-to-day basis that might contribute to 
the structuring of unequal outcomes? 
What have I learned about how to perceive or how to relate to members of my 
own or other ethnic groups and what is the source of that learning? To be spe-
cific, what do I as a middle-class, white, professional female (her location in 
the social structures of gender, class, and race) know about how to relate to and 
interpret the behavior of others who occupy similar as well as different social 
locations? 
What have I learned about how to interpret the behavior of someone whose 
self-identification is African American? What if I add class or gender to the 
equation? 
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What do I know about my conscious intentions when I interact with an African-
American client, in particular, a client in crisis with a potential to be hospitalized? 
Why is there a disjuncture between the motivations and intentions of which I 
am aware and the objective outcomes as reported? 
This seeming contradiction between intention (part of "my world") 
and outcome (part of "the world") requires further reflection. To add 
to the complexity of the reflective task, in Giddens's theory, people are 
not just passive recipients on which the structures of society act; they 
are active agents.95 That is to say, in various ways they may challenge the 
received prescriptions and proscriptions that keep them marginalized; 
they may resist submission to an authority that is perceived as imposed 
and culturally alien. Through further reflection, the social worker in this 
case might come to recognize that in the emergency room, she and other 
professionals are in a position of authority and power. She and her co-
professionals can, with legal and medical justification, take actions that 
have consequences for an individual's freedom and sense of personal 
integrity. In addition, she and her Caucasian colleagues are part of a 
group that has historically dominated, marginalized, and treated with 
disrespect members of ethnic and cultural minority groups.96 This group 
history plus individual expectations based on personal experience with 
racism are integrated as part of what a minority client knows (tacitiy and 
overtly) about interactions with members of the majority culture.97 Thus, 
the social worker might consider questions such as the following: 
What part of the behavior of clients in the emergency room may be interpreted 
as resistance to further marginalization, disempowerment, and disrespect? 
What clinical choices might I make differently if I were to view some of the 
"presenting" behavior in the emergency room as positive—as opposition or 
challenge to further disempowerment—instead of viewing it as antisocial acting 
out? Would I look at diagnosis differently?98 Would I take more time in assessing 
safety and dangerousness? Would I take a more serious look at options other than 
hospitalization in such cases? 
As a result of her reflections, this social worker might conclude that some 
of her decisions to recommend hospitalization or to involve security per-
sonnel in particular cases may have been based on her misconstrual of 
the relations of power and marginalization in her clinical setting. 
At this point, it is clear that the social worker in our example has gone 
far afield from simple reflection on personal beliefs, intentions, affects, 
and attitudes. She has examined one instance of how socially structured 
relations of power and privilege are constructed (misconstructed) in the 
interactions between a white, middle-class social worker and minority cli-
ents, including how each actor, by operating out of his or her own "prac-
tical knowledge" (i.e., "tacit stocks of knowledge which actors draw upon 
in the constitution of social activity")9 9 and by interacting in ways that 
each saw as necessary or compelling, contributed to outcomes none may 
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have consciously intended. Acting out of a consciousness shaped by so-
ciety, parties in this case succeed in reproducing the very structure that 
has shaped that same consciousness as it relates to racism.100 Going well 
beyond identification of personal bias, the aim of this social worker's re-
flection was to make both ordinary awareness and routine interactions 
problematic with regard to structural consequences. Of course, the ex-
ample above assumes the case of a social worker who is motivated to 
understand the implications of her actions. The larger picture is much 
more complicated, including, as it does, the behavior of actors who do 
not view racism as a problem or who even justify its existence, along 
with laws, regulations, and procedures that may disadvantage particular 
groups. However, these factors do not change the essential argument. 
Central to Giddens's thesis is the recognition that laws, regulations, pro-
cedures, and inequities of access to power and privilege are all structural 
products of human agency over time. Social structures and institutional-
ized support for those structures do not exist without the social actions 
of human beings. 
Concluding Comment: Implications for Social Work 
In their controversial book Unfaithful Angels, Harry Specht and Mark 
Courtney deplore what they regard as the retreat of the social work pro-
fession away from macro-considerations to a micro-emphasis on individ-
ual (especially intrapsychic) solutions.101 The profession's conventional 
ways of conceptualizing practitioner self-awareness reflect this retreat. I 
have suggested that Giddens's structuration theory offers an approach to 
self-awareness that includes macro-considerations as a necessary part of 
the definition of what it means to be a self-aware, reflective practitioner. 
This approach to self-awareness and the theory that underpins it hold a 
number of implications of for social work education and practice. 
In social work, as in sociology, there has been an unfortunate bifurca-
tion between micro- and macro-theory. Over the past several decades, 
efforts have been made to bridge this gap. Of note are efforts by scholars 
who have contributed to the development of a systems perspective and 
various ecological frameworks.102 What these several perspectives have in 
common is an understanding that "individuals are engaged in constant 
transactions with other human beings and with other systems in the en-
vironment and that these various persons and systems reciprocally influ-
ence each other." 1 0 3 Ecosystem frameworks as a group succeed in show-
ing that micro-systems do not exist in a vacuum and that the behavior of 
individuals and families must be understood in relation to larger social 
systems. However, these perspectives artificially place the individual over 
and against the social structure as two separate, interacting elements— 
the self-system in interaction with society. Missing from such accounts is 
a concept of self as co-constituting and comaintaining society, that is, self 
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as insider and creator. Giddens's theory suggests that human beings are 
consummately insider to social structure and cannot opt out of it. To 
paraphrase an old maxim: We have met society and it is us. 
As a result of the macro/micro division in social work practice, the 
conception of a self as active subject has been confined largely to one's 
immediate social encounters, and social transformation generally has 
meant self-transformation. At the same time, larger macro-structures 
(e.g., the structures that support racism, classism, and sexism) have 
been viewed as part of the context of human activity, something that in-
fluences human behavior but is subject to change only as a result of 
grander, sociohistorical processes or (in the profession) through the ef-
forts of those special practitioners who choose to become "activists." 
Giddens's theory is consummately a theory of the human actor. For Gid-
dens, the idea that human beings interact with a society defined as some 
entity external to individuals amounts to a reification and an anthropo-
morphization of human institutions: "Social systems have no purpose, 
reasons, or needs, whatsoever; only human individuals do so . " 1 0 4 Social 
systems do not act; only human actors do. 
Social institutions are human constructions; they have no existence 
apart from the human actions that constitute and reconstitute their form 
and substance. Of course, social institutions are not human constructs 
in the same way daydreams or smoke are constructions. Nor do social 
institutions change readily or without effort. Giddens does not deny the 
existence of social regularities and social uniformities that are heavily 
buttressed by convention and ideology.105 Indeed, there is a solidity to 
human social arrangements; time, history, tradition, culture, law, ide-
ology, and the behavior of many, many actors all hold human social struc-
tures together. But these and others like them are also human con-
structs. Thus, within Giddens's structuration theory, we find the 
possibility for a more "actor-oriented" social work, one in which the in-
dividual is conceptualized not as simply the passive object of society's 
forces or the passive recipient of society's dictates but as intrinsically im-
plicated in society—acting, conforming, resisting, challenging, and 
modifying. To be an agent, Giddens maintains, is to make a difference in 
social outcomes and, "since 'to make a difference' is to transform some 
aspect of a process or event, agency in structuration theory is equated 
with transformative capacity."1 0 6 This is an actor capable not only of self 
transformation but of social transformation as well. 
For social work, all of this implies that the historical argument over 
whether social workers should be prepared for social-change roles is 
largely a moot issue.107 Like all other individuals, social workers are al-
ways involved in social change and social stability. As individuals and as 
professionals, social workers' daily interactions with clients and others 
have consequences for maintaining or altering society's structures. Be-
cause of the social work profession's unique role with clients who are 
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often marginalized within society's structures, this social-structural con-
sequence of professional activity is not insignificant. The key choice, 
then, is not whether to be an agent of change but whether to be a more 
conscious agent of change. The goal of the kind of critical reflectivity 
defined here is nothing less than this: that social work professionals "as 
knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the sociohis-
torical reality which shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform 
that reality."108 
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